"Perhaps you only imagined doing it": Reality-monitoring in obsessive-compulsive checkers using semi-idiographic stimuli by Cougle, JR et al.
Reality-monitoring 
 
1
Running head: REALITY-MONITORING 
 
 
 
 
“Perhaps you only imagined doing it”: Reality-Monitoring in Obsessive-Compulsive Checkers 
Using Semi-Idiographic Stimuli 
 
Jesse R. Cougle1, Paul M. Salkovskis2, Susan J. Thorpe3 
 
 
1Department of Experimental Psychology, University of Oxford, South Parks Road, Oxford, 
OX1 3UD, UK 
2Department of Psychology, PO Box 077, Institute of Psychiatry, de Crespigny Park, Denmark 
Hill, London, SE5 8AF, UK 
3Department of Psychology, School of Human Sciences, University of Surrey, Guildford, Surrey 
GU2 7XH, UK 
 
 
 
 
Correspondence concerning the manuscript may be addressed to Jesse R. Cougle, 
Department of Psychology, University of Texas, 1 University Station A8000, Austin, TX 78712-
0187, Office: 512-471-3722. Email: cougle@mail.utexas.edu.  
Reality-monitoring 2
Abstract 
Memory failures reported by obsessive-compulsive (OC) checkers often seem to 
be errors of “reality-monitoring”, or misremembering whether one performed or 
imagined performing an action. To examine these memory processes in the context in 
which such errors are said to occur, an in-home reality-monitoring experiment involving 
bothersome and non-bothersome actions was conducted with 21 OC checkers and 24 
non-clinical controls. OC checkers reported poorer confidence in memory, but both 
groups performed similarly on tests of immediate and delayed free and prompted recall. 
Among OC checkers (but not controls), accuracy in recall and confidence in memory 
were correlated. Theoretical implications are discussed.  
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“Perhaps you only imagined doing it”: Reality-Monitoring in Obsessive-Compulsive 
Checkers Using Semi-Idiographic Stimuli 
1. Introduction 
Obsessive-Compulsive (OC) checkers often attribute their checking to memory 
difficulties. Theoretical formulations focusing on the idea that a memory deficit may be 
responsible for repetitive checking behaviours have good face validity (Sher, Frost, & 
Otto, 1983; Sher, Mann, Frost, 1984; Sher, Frost, Kushner, Crews, & Alexander, 1989; 
Purcell, Maruff, Kyrios, & Pantellis, 1998). OC checking could readily be conceptualized 
as behaviour intended to compensate for poor memory. However, observations such as 
the situational specificity of checking behaviours have raised the possibility that poor 
confidence in memory could account for compulsive checking (Rachman 2002; 
Salkovskis 1996; Salkovskis & Kirk, 1997). The OC sufferer may check as a response to 
the experience of levels of confidence in memory that fall short of the standards they set 
for themselves; this discrepancy is most likely to occur when they believe that the 
consequences of an error are particularly serious. Salkovskis (1985; 1999) proposes that 
people who suffer from OCD are particularly sensitive to the possibility that their actions 
may result in them being responsible for harm to themselves or others. When applied to 
the decision as to whether one has completed an action, such beliefs would result in a 
further undermining of confidence levels and/or the requirement of still higher standards 
of confidence in recall. There is evidence that repetitive checking is counter-productive 
and can lead to a further decline in memory confidence (van den Hout & Kindt, 2003; 
Radomsky, Gilchrist & Dussault, 2006), and a cycle of checking behaviour.  
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There is some evidence consistent with both types of theory. Woods and 
colleagues (2002,) concluded in their recent meta-analysis of memory and checking 
studies that a deficit may exist for checkers on several different types of memory tasks, 
including verbal and visual recall, and recall of actions. However, they also found that the 
effect sizes for poor confidence in memory were much larger and more consistent across 
studies than those noted for memory deficits.   
 Some of the most convincing evidence of mnestic deficits among OC checkers 
was found in a neuropsychological investigation by Purcell, Maruff, Kyrios, and Pantelis 
(1998). They paired OC checkers with non-clinical controls from the general population 
and patients suffering from panic disorder and unipolar depression. OC checkers had 
lower scores than other groups on tests of spatial working memory, spatial recognition, 
and motor initiation and execution. Unfortunately, it was not clear how OC checkers 
performed relative to non-checking OCs. This is important because the direct memory 
deficit hypothesis is most relevant to checking and it would be important to examine how 
much obsessive rumination (characteristic of both OC checking and non-checking 
groups) may have affected the memory performance of obsessive-compulsive checkers in 
this study. The effects of rumination on test scores were investigated by Davis and 
Nolen-Hoeksema (2000), who found cognitive test scores among non-OCD ruminators 
similar to those typical of patients suffering from OCD. It is, therefore, possible that 
obsessions may serve as a distraction from the different tasks both groups were asked to 
perform.  
 Given the difficulty in identifying gross memory deficits, it has been suggested 
that the deficit is one of reality monitoring (Sher et al., 1983); that is, the recall of 
Reality-monitoring 5
whether an action has actually been performed or only imagined. Ecker and Engelkamp 
(1995) examined reality-monitoring in OC checkers, low-checking clinical, and high-
checking clinical groups. They gave participants four different tasks: 1) mime an action 
(motor encoding), 2) imagine themselves performing an action, 3) imagine seeing 
someone else perform an action (motor-imaginal encoding), and 4) subvocal rehearsal (as 
a control condition). They found that OCD patients scored lower than low-checking 
controls on free-recall tests of motor-encoding and also made more mistakes of reality-
monitoring. In addition, the motor imaginal and motor confusion (mistakes of reality-
monitoring) scores were significantly correlated with their scores on the checking 
subscale of the MOCI (Hodgson & Rachman, 1978). OC participants obtained similar 
overall scores to high-checking clinical controls; however, they were found to make 
different types of errors. OC checkers were more likely to make type A errors 
(incorrectly remembering that they imagined an action they actually performed), and 
high-checking controls made more type B errors (recalling the performance of an action 
they actually imagined) than low-checking controls. In this study, memory tasks were 
carried out in a laboratory and not in the environment in which OC checkers experience 
their specific memory problems. The actions did not involve anxiety-provoking 
situations, nor were they personally relevant to the participants.  
 Some attempts have been made to test memory for actions in conditions that are 
anxiety-provoking for OC checkers. Anxiety experienced by the OC checker may 
interfere with the process of memory retrieval; the perception of poor retrieval could in 
turn motivate checking behaviours. Constans, Foa, Franklin, and Mathews (1995) tested 
reality-monitoring ability among OC checkers and non-clinical controls through the use 
Reality-monitoring 6
of neutral actions (e.g., capping and uncapping a pen) and anxiety-provoking actions 
(e.g., turning on and off a lamp). They found no difference in reality-monitoring ability 
between OC checkers and non-clinical controls. However, OC checkers were more likely 
to desire a greater vividness in recollection than controls. In fact, their memory for how 
anxiety-provoking items were left was significantly better than controls. 
 More recently, Hermans and colleagues (2003) built on the work of Constans et 
al. (1995) through the use of ideographically-selected stimuli. OC checkers and yoked 
non-anxious controls were asked to perform or imagine a series of actions: three relevant 
compulsive actions, six irrelevant compulsive actions, and six neutral actions. No 
differences were found between groups for reality-monitoring ability. In addition, 
memory accuracy did not vary by category of action. OC checkers also reported lower 
confidence in memory than controls, but only for neutral actions.  
 Threat and responsibility appraisals influence the occurrence of checking 
behaviour (Ladouceur, Rhéaume, & Aublet, 1997). Given the importance of 
responsibility for harm in cognitive models of compulsive checking (Rachman, 2002; 
Salkovskis 1999) and the specificity of OC checkers memory problems, what is needed is 
an evaluation of memory for actions in an  environment for which compulsive checkers 
feel personally responsible, focussing on stimuli normally checked by these individuals.  
Radomsky, Rachman, & Hammond (2001) evaluated memory in the homes of OC 
checkers. Participants were asked to check an item that normally causes distress or 
discomfort (e.g., the stove). In addition, responsibility was manipulated by having 
participants (high responsibility) or the experimenter (low responsibility) carry out 
different checks. Participants were also told that they would be tested afterwards on their 
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memory for the check and for other things that may have happened during the check (i.e., 
threat irrelevant information). The experimenter provided threat irrelevant information by 
coughing, clipping a coloured pin to his shirt, or reading aloud different 4-digit lists 
during each check. Participants were more likely to remember threat-relevant information 
(e.g., how many times they touched the stove) than threat-irrelevant information (e.g., the 
colour of the experimenter’s pen), and this memory bias was augmented under conditions 
of high responsibility. The absence of an anxious control group in this study, however, 
means that it was not possible to evaluate whether or not memory biases were specific to 
compulsive checkers.  
The aim of the present study was to test reality-monitoring ability, memory for 
actions, and confidence in memory among OC checkers and Non-Clinical Controls 
(NCCs) in the course of home visits using stimuli that are and are not bothersome to 
them. We predicted that OC checkers would not have memory deficits relative to controls 
but that they would express less confidence in their memory than controls, especially 
concerning items which are particularly bothersome to them. In addition, given that two 
different experiments have recently linked increased responsibility with decreased 
confidence in memory among OCs (Boschen & Vulksanovic, in press; Moritz et al., in 
press), we predicted that an experimental manipulation of responsibility for harm would 
result in lower confidence in memory for individuals in the “high responsibility” 
condition compared to participants in the “low responsibility” condition and that these 
effects would be present for OC checkers but not NCCs.  
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2. Method 
2.1. Participants 
The experiment was completed by patients who met DSM-IV (SCID) criteria for OCD 
(n=21) and whose primary compulsion was checking. NCCs (n=24) from Oxford, 
England, and the surrounding area. Controls were recruited by word of mouth and from 
among staff at the Warneford Hospital in Oxford. Patients were recruited from therapists 
associated with the Oxford University Psychiatry department. Some also responded to 
advertisements in self-help newsletters. A payment of seven pounds was given to all 
participants upon completion of the experiment.  
Participant demographic and psychometric information is given in Table 1. Group 
differences were examined using chi-square (for gender) and ANOVA tests.  
2.2. Design 
In-home visits were scheduled with the experimenter (JC). Upon arrival, participants 
were asked to either perform or imagine performing actions which the participant thought 
were bothersome and non-bothersome. After completing these tasks, participants were 
given a two-minute filler task and were then asked to recall the actions they had 
previously performed and imagined performing. In addition, they rated their confidence 
in each recollection. Following the free recall task, participants were given a list of the 
actions used and were asked to determine whether they actually performed it or only 
imagined performing each. Again, they provided ratings of their confidence in their 
memory for each recollection. Anxiety, depression, discomfort, and urge to check ratings 
were taken throughout these tasks using Visual Analogue Scales.  
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Participants were then asked to refrain from checking and were randomised to one 
of the two experimental groups using sampling without replacement. In one condition, 
participants were told that they were responsible for anything bad that may happen as a 
result of their not checking and in the other that the experimenter was responsible for 
these things. A contract was given to confirm the agreement. The researcher then left the 
participant’s house and, after an hour, phoned them for a post-experiment interview 
lasting approximately 15 min. Memory was again assessed for imagined and performed 
actions (free recall, prompted recall, and confidence in memory). In addition, several 
ratings which dealt with how they had been feeling since the experimenter left were 
made.   
2.3. Measures 
Visual analogue scales assessing anxiety, discomfort, urge to check, and 
depression were used at various points during the experiment. These measures were rated 
from 0 (e.g., ‘Not at all anxious’) – 100 (e.g., ‘Extremely anxious’). 
 Participants completed measures of depression (BDI; Beck, Ward, Mendelson, 
Mock & Erbaugh, 1961), anxiety (BAI; Beck, Epstein, Brown, & Steer, 1988), OC 
symptoms (OCI; Foa, Kozak, Salkovskis, Coles, & Amir, 1998), and responsibility 
beliefs (RAS) and appraisals (RIQ; Salkovskis et al., 2000).  
2.4. Procedure 
Participants completed the questionnaires in their own time before a home visit was 
arranged with the researcher. Upon arrival at the participants’ home, the researcher 
explained to them the Visual Analogue (VA) scales that would be used. Participants were 
then shown a list of 11 common activities which can elicit checking obsessions and were 
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asked to rate how bothersome each checking-related action was for them. The list is 
provided in Table 2. The two most bothersome and two least bothersome categories were 
identified for use in the subsequent reality-monitoring tasks. Memory tasks were then 
explained to participants: “Now, I’m going to ask you in a minute to perform a task or 
imagine yourself performing a task. By imagining, I mean to picture yourself in your 
mind performing the action that I may give you. Is that clear? For example, I can either 
draw a ‘two’ like this (draw two) or imagine myself drawing a ‘two’.” Further discussion 
was continued until it was clear that the participant fully understood the task procedure. 
They were taken through six different tasks associated with each of the chosen 
categories (24 in all), alternating between actual and imagined actions and troublesome 
and non-troublesome categories. The list of actions was standardized, but if an item was 
not available in the home (e.g., if one did not have a stereo to unplug), a suitable 
alternative which was related to the category would be found (they may have been asked 
to unplug a coffee-maker). They were asked to report how they were feeling by using the 
VA scales after completing each category of actions. After they had completed the tasks, 
they were asked to complete anxiety (BAI) and depression (BDI) inventories during a 
two min distraction time interval. They were then asked to recall all of the actions they 
did or imagined themselves doing in any order. A confidence in memory rating (0 = not 
at all confident, 100 = extremely confident) was obtained for each recalled item. VA 
scale readings were taken again.  
The researcher then prompted participants with each item alternating randomly 
between categories. Participants reported whether they performed or imagined each 
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action and their confidence in their recollections. VA scale readings were obtained, and 
participants were asked to finish the BDI and BAI if they were not completed by now. 
The next stage of the experiment involved a responsibility manipulation. ‘High’ 
or ‘low’ responsibility contracts based on those used in the Lopatka and Rachman (1995) 
study were presented to participants after they completed the in-home memory tasks. The 
‘low responsibility’ contract indicated that the experimenter would be responsible for any 
harm that would come as a result of not checking the relevant memory items during a one 
hour period. The ‘high responsibility’ contract stated that, during this one hour period, the 
participant would be responsible for any harm associated with the memory task items. 
Participants were placed in two different conditions through the use of either of the 
following instructions: 
a) “I know that I’ve asked you to perform tasks that may be very 
distressing to you, but I want you to refrain from checking for the next hour. I will 
call you in an hour’s time, but until then, I’d like you to please refrain from 
checking. During this hour, I want you to know that I’ll be completely responsible 
for any harm that may come as a result of your not checking. I will be responsible 
only for this hour and only concerning the items we have dealt with. Just to make 
sure that you understand this agreement, I’ve made a contract. I’d like to go over 
the main points with you (went over main points on low-responsibility contract).” 
b) “I know that I’ve asked you to perform tasks that may be very 
distressing to you, but I want you to refrain from checking for the next hour. I will 
call you in an hour’s time, but until then, I’d like you to please refrain from 
checking. I want you to know that I will not be responsible for any harm that may 
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come as a result of your not checking during this hour. You will be completely 
responsible for anything bad that happens with these items. Just to make sure that 
you understand this agreement, I’ve made a contract. I’d like to go over the main 
points with you (went over main points on high-responsibility contract).” 
After the participant had read the contract, two copies were signed by the 
researcher and the participant. One copy was left with the participant. VA scale readings 
were taken again. An envelope with an enclosed scale was given to the participant and 
he/she was instructed not to open it. They were told that they would be phoned in an 
hour’s time. They were reminded not to check during the following hour. In addition, 
they were told to take a ten minute walk. 
 After an hour passed, the researcher phoned participants for a post-experiment 
interview. Current anxiety, discomfort, urge to check, and depression ratings were taken. 
Tests of free recall were repeated. Participants were prompted with any items omitted 
from the free recall list, and were asked whether they imagined or performed the action. 
Confidence in memory ratings were taken for each action reported. Participants were 
asked to rate how much they checked any of the experiment items during the one hour 
period: 0 (not at all), 1 (a very small amount, or less than a minute), 2 (a moderate 
amount, more than once but less than ten times, or more than one minute but less than 
five minutes), 3 (frequently, or between 10 and 20 times, or 10 and 20 minutes), or 4 
(very frequently, over 20 times or 20 minutes).  
Participants were then asked to open the envelope and examine the rating scales 
included. They were asked several questions and rated their response using each scale. 
First, they were asked to rate how much of the past hour they had been directly thinking 
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about the actions the experimenter had asked them to perform or imagine performing 
(had been actively ruminating about them in the front of their minds). They were then 
asked to rate how much of the hour, in addition to the time directly thinking about those 
actions, they were still there at the back of their minds (meaning that they have been 
actively thinking about something else while still having an awareness of those actions). 
Participants were also asked how hard they tried to ‘deliberately go over in your mind 
what you had done or how you had left things’. Next, they were asked to rate their 
current discomfort associated with the actions and their highest level of discomfort during 
the past hour. They were then asked to rate how likely it seemed at present that 
something bad would happen in connection with the actions they performed; they also 
rated the highest level of likelihood they felt during the past hour. In addition, 
responsibility for harm ratings were completed which related to the level they currently 
felt and the highest level they felt during the past hour. After completing these general 
ratings, participants were asked to give five ratings for each category of actions they 
completed. They indicated how confident they were that there was no problem with the 
way items were left, their anxiety associated with the item, their discomfort about the 
item, their present urge to check the item, and their greatest urge to check the item during 
the past hour. Final anxiety, discomfort, urge to check, and depression ratings were then 
obtained. 
3. Statistical Analyses 
Unless otherwise stated, 2 (OC vs NCC) X 2 (Immediate vs Delayed) X 2 (Bothersome 
vs Non-Bothersome) repeated measures ANCOVAs were used throughout. Because 
education level was positively correlated with greater memory accuracy, r = .39, p <.01, 
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and was also significantly higher among NCCs, it was used as a covariate in each 
analysis. Where interactions were significant, simple main effects analyses were carried 
out using one-way ANCOVAs.  
4. Results 
In the first section below, participants’ reactions to engaging in the experimental tasks are 
analyzed in order to indicate the way in which the memory task was perceived; this 
section also describes an analysis of the experimental manipulation check. The key 
memory variables are presented next as the principal test of the hypothesis. Thirdly, 
correlations are considered.  
4.1. Reaction to Experimental Tasks 
4.1.1. Visual Analogue Scales 
Visual analogue scales which were presented to participants before and after each 
category of actions to be imagined or performed, after the responsibility contracts were 
signed, and before and after the phone interview. These ratings indicate the participants’ 
response to participation in the study. Repeated measures ANCOVAs were used to 
examine group and time of assessment differences. Scores for anxiety did not 
significantly vary across the time points of the experiment, F(10,410)=1.58, p=.11, at 
which it was measured, but a main effect was found for group, F(1,41)=102.27, p<.0001, 
with OC checkers reporting significantly greater anxiety than NCCs (OC: M=47.35, 
SE=2.7; NCC: M=8.31, SE=2.6). No group X time interaction was found (F<1). Similar 
results were found for measures of discomfort, where scores did not significantly vary 
across time, F(10,410)=1.31, p=.23, and OCs reported greater discomfort than NCCs, 
F(1,41)=97.07, p<.0001; OC: M=46.72, SE=2.9; NCC: M=6.02, SE=2.8. No group X 
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time interaction was found (F<2). A main effect for group was also found for urge to 
check, F(1,42)=43.53, p<.0001, and this was qualified by a significant group X time 
interaction, F(10,420)=3.62, p<.05. Follow-up tests revealed that differences in urge to 
check ratings were not present at baseline, F(1,42)=2.85, p=.099; OC: M=28.86, SE=5.9; 
NCC: M=14.75, SE=5.5. However, during VAS assessment points 2 to 11, urge to check 
ratings were significantly higher among OCs than NCCs (F>10, p<.002, OC: M=40.59, 
SE=3.5; NCC: M=6.18, SE=3.3). A main effect of group was found for depression 
ratings, F(1,42)=33.16, p<.0001, but not time, F(10,420)=1.04, p>.40. A group X time 
interaction was also found, F(10,420)=2.40, p<.01. Follow-up tests revealed greater 
depression ratings among OCs than NCCs for each time point (F>18, p<.0001; OC: 
M=27.09, SE=3.1; NCC: M=1.64, SE=2.9). Among OCs, depression ratings differed 
significantly over time, F(10,200)=2.00, p<.05. Pairwise comparisons indicate that 
depression was significantly higher at time points 7, 9, and 10 than at time point 2, p<.05. 
Depression was also significantly higher at time point 9 than at point 5, p<.05. These 
findings suggest that depression was higher during the later stages of the experiment than 
at baseline. Overall, these results suggest that OCs were significantly more distressed 
while carrying out the memory tasks than NCCs, and that the task provoked the urge to 
check in OC patients but not controls. 
4.1.2. Manipulation Check  
The responsibility contract did not result in any significant effects for either group during 
the follow-up period. Perceived levels of responsibility, urge to check, and mood ratings 
during the delay period did not differ significantly between participants in the high- and 
low-responsibility conditions (F<1), nor were any group X contract interactions found 
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for these variables (F<1). OC checkers reported greater levels of responsibility (low 
contract: M=47.63, SE=8.2; high contract: M=53.87, SE=9.1) during the delay period 
than NCCs (low contract: M=19.15, SE=8.2; high contract: M=10.52, SE=8.0), 
F(1,42)=17.15, p<.0002. There was a marginally significant group X contract interaction 
for the amount of glancing and checking behaviour during the delay period, 
F(1,41)=2.88, p=.097. However, follow-up tests revealed no significant differences 
between high and low responsibility contracts for either NCCs or OC checkers, p>.10.   
4.2. Memory effects 
4.2.1. Free recall accuracy 
Group means and standard deviations for memory accuracy (maximum score = 12) and 
confidence in memory ratings are given in Table 3. Free recall accuracy was examined 
according to whether participants correctly recalled what actions they performed or 
imagined themselves performing without being prompted. The crucial main effects of 
group were not significant (F<1), nor were there any significant interactions involving 
group and time of test or item type (F<2). In addition, no main effects of group, item 
type, or time of memory test were found (F<1). These results suggest comparable 
memory for actions in terms of reality-monitoring between OC checkers and NCCs in 
tests of free recall. No effect of responsibility contract on memory accuracy was found 
for either group, p>.10. 
4.2.2. Analysis of Free Recall Errors 
Free recall errors were calculated for both groups through an analysis of instances where 
participants did not recall an action which was performed or imagined (no recollection 
errors) or errors where confusion was made between an actual or imagined action 
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(reality-monitoring errors). A 2 (OC vs NCC) X 2 (Bothersome vs Non-bothersome) X 2 
(Immediate vs Delayed) X 2 (Imagined actions vs Performed actions) repeated measures 
ANCOVA was carried out to examine ‘no recollection’ errors. No significant differences 
were found between groups for no-recollection errors (F<1; OC: M=2.64, SE=.2; NCC: 
M=2.39, SE=.2), but both groups were more likely to forget actions which they had 
imagined relative to actions they performed, F(1,42)=9.92, p<.005. A 2 (OC vs NCC) X 
2 (Bothersome vs Non-bothersome) X 2 (Immediate vs Delayed) X 2 (Imagined actions 
recalled as performed vs Performed actions recalled as imagined) repeated measures 
ANCOVA was carried out to examine ‘reality monitoring’ errors. Groups did not 
significantly differ in errors of reality monitoring, F(1,42)=2.34, p=.13 (OC: M=.19, 
SE=.05; NCC: M=.31, SE=.05). No main effects or interactions for free recall reality-
monitoring errors were found (F<4).  
Free recall errors which involved actions which were neither performed nor 
imagined were analyzed using a 2 (OC vs NCC) X 2 (Bothersome vs Non-bothersome) X 
2 (Immediate vs Delayed) X 2 (Actions recalled as imagined vs Actions recalled as 
performed). No significant differences were found between groups, F(1,42)=.26, p>.60 
(OC: M=2.83, SE=.2; NCC: M=2.69, SE=.2). A main effect of error type (performed vs 
imagined) was found, F(1,42)=12.37, p<.002, which was qualified by a significant item 
type X time X error type X group interaction, F(1,42)=4.53, p<.05. Follow-up tests 
revealed a marginally significant item type X error type X group interaction for the 
immediate recall period, F(1,42)=3.79, p=.058, though this interaction was absent for the 
delayed free recall test (F<1). Further analyses of immediate tests revealed a significant 
group X item type interaction for items recalled as imagined, F(1,42)=4.39, p<.05, 
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though this interaction was not present for items recalled as performed (F<1). Additional 
analyses found a trend for OCs reporting a greater number of imagined recollection errors 
for non-bothersome items than NCCs, F(1,42)=3.10, p=.086 (OC: M=3.69, SE=.3; NCC: 
M=2.90, SE=.3), though no group differences were found for bothersome items (F<1).   
4.2.3. Prompted recall accuracy 
Prompted recall was taken after reality-monitoring tasks were completed and during the 
phone interview by providing participants with a list of actions they performed or only 
imagined performing. Participants were asked to state whether they performed or 
imagined performing each action. No differences between groups emerged, F(1,42)=1.32, 
p>.20, but a significant main effect for item type was found, F(1,42)=6.91, p<.05. This 
reflects the fact that participants recalled non-bothersome items (M=10.70, SE=.2) with 
greater accuracy than bothersome items (M=10.09, SE=.2). No effect of responsibility 
contract on memory accuracy was found for either group, p>.10. 
Prompted recall errors came in two forms: stating that one performed an action 
he/she actually imagined or stating one imagined an action that he/she actually 
performed. No significant interactions or differences between groups were found for 
these errors (F<1). 
4.2.4. Confidence in memory 
 Reports of confidence in memory for free recall showed significant differences 
between groups, F(1,31)=4.56, p<.05, with OC checkers reporting significantly lower 
confidence in recollections. This main effect was qualified by a significant time X item 
type X group interaction, F(1,31)=7.23, p<.05. Follow-up tests revealed a trend for a time 
X group interaction among bothersome items (F(1,34)=3.00, p=.09) that was not present 
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for non-bothersome items, F(1,36)=2.17, p=.15. Additional analyses revealed that, 
compared to OC checkers, NCCs reported significantly greater confidence for 
bothersome items in the immediate testing period, F(1,37)=6.85, p<.05, though groups 
did not differ significantly for bothersome items in the delayed test, F(1,35)=2.85, p=.10. 
No effect of responsibility contract on memory confidence was found for either group, 
p>.10. 
 Confidence in memory for prompted recall items was analysed, and a main effect 
for group was found, F(1,42)=15.33, p<.001, with OCs reporting significantly less 
confidence in memory than NCCs. No significant differences were found across time of 
test, nor were any interactions found. There was a trend for participants to report greater 
confidence in memory for non-bothersome items (M=85.75, SE=1.8) than bothersome 
items (M=81.50, SE=1.8; F(1,42)=3.17, p=.08). In addition, no effect of responsibility 
contract on memory confidence was found for either group, p>.10. 
4.3. Analysis of situational variables and correlational analyses 
4.3.1. Post-experiment interview ratings 
State measures which were taken by the phone interview were analysed. Self-
report ratings for anxiety, discomfort, urge to check and depression were significantly 
higher in OCs than controls, F>15, p<.0005. These were taken at the beginning and at the 
end of the interview. Significant differences between groups were found for 
checking/glancing during the past hour, F(1,42)=5.91, p<.05, whether or not they sought 
reassurance, F(1,42)=11.00, p<.005, rumination about items during the past hour (front of 
mind: F(1,42)=11.90, p<.005; back of mind: F(1,42)=14.96, p<.001), present discomfort 
about items, F(1,42)=35.40, p<.0001, discomfort about items during the past hour, 
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F(1,42)=37.64, p<.0001, present perception of likelihood of harm, F(1,42)=28.37, 
p<.001, peak likelihood of harm during the past hour, F(1,42)=31.13, p<.0001, and 
present responsibility for harm, F(1,42)=35.50, p<.0001. These differences reflect the 
fact that OC checkers rated themselves significantly higher on these measures than 
controls.  
Post-experiment interview measurements were then analyzed which concerned 
each of the four specific categories of actions participants chose. These item categories 
were previously ranked by participants as the first and second most bothersome and the 
first and second least bothersome. A 2 (OCD vs Controls) X 2 (Bothersome vs Non-
Bothersome) X 2 (First vs Second) repeated measures ANCOVA was carried out which 
found no main effects between bothersome and non-bothersome categories (F<1) or first- 
and second-rated categories (F<1) on the measure of confidence that there is no problem 
with the way an item was left. A significant main effect was found between groups, 
F(1,42)=32.62, p<.0001. Also, a significant group X item type interaction was found, 
F(1,42)=6.00, p<.05. This interaction was due to OCs reporting less confidence for 
bothersome items (M=61.43, SE=5.0) than non-bothersome items (M=75.48, SE=4.2; 
F(1,20)=8.88, p<.01), though this difference was absent in NCCs (F<2). Significant main 
effects for groups were found in which OC checkers scored higher than NCCs in 
measures of anxiety, (F(1,42)=64.54, p<.0001), discomfort (F(1,42)=58.65, p<.0001), 
urge to check at present (F(1,42)=26.42, p<.0001), and the peak urge to check in the past 
hour (F(1,42)=61.60, p<.0001) associated with the test items. Again, significant 
interactions were found between item type and group for anxiety (F(1,42)=14.77, 
p<.001), discomfort (F(1,42)=15.78, p<.001), urge to check at present (F(1,42)=21.88, 
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p<.0001), and peak urge to check during the past hour (F(1,42)=11.03, p<.005). These 
interactions indicate that OC checkers scored higher on these measures for bothersome 
items than for non-bothersome items (F>9). NCCs reported greater peak urge to check 
for bothersome items than non-bothersome items, F(1,23)=9.13, p<.01, though this 
distinction was not present with any other post-experiment measure.  
4.3.2. Responsibility beliefs and memory performance 
 To test whether perceived responsibility for harm during the delay period and at 
the time of the second memory test may have led to recollection errors after the delay 
period, partial correlation analyses were carried out which controlled for memory 
performance on the immediate (in-home) memory tests. Analyses found no significant 
relationship between responsibility levels and delayed memory performance for 
bothersome items. However, among non-bothersome items tested for prompted recall, a 
significant negative correlation was found between accuracy and levels of responsibility 
reported at the delayed memory test, r(42)=-.42, p<.005, and during the delay period,  
r(42)=-.37, p<.05. This suggests that participants reporting greater levels of responsibility 
were more likely to make errors of prompted recall for non-bothersome items.  
Partial correlation analyses were also carried out on confidence in memory 
reports, while controlling for confidence in memory expressed on immediate memory 
tests. Confidence in memory reported for the delayed tests was not correlated with 
responsibility levels for bothersome items. However, among non-bothersome items, 
levels of responsibility reported at the delayed memory test, r(36)=-.35, p<.05, and peak 
levels of responsibility during the delay period, r(36)=-.35, p<.05, were negatively 
correlated with confidence in memory on the delayed test of free recall. These findings 
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suggest that participants reporting greater levels of responsibility were more likely to 
report poorer confidence in memory for free recall recollections of non-bothersome items 
at the delayed memory test.  
4.3.3. Correlational Analyses 
OC participants’ ratings for confidence in memory correlated significantly with 
accuracy in delayed prompted tests for bothersome, r=.63, p<.005, and non-bothersome 
items, r=.64, p<.005. No significant correlations were found on these measures with 
NCCs (bothersome, r=-.20; non-bothersome, r=.16). These results suggest that OC 
checkers, but not NCCs, tend to report higher confidence when they recall accurately and 
lower confidence when their recollections are inaccurate.  
Correlational analyses were also carried out using both OCs and control 
participants’ ratings of responsibility for harm felt during the delay period. Responsibility 
was found to correlate well with how much a participant glanced during the delay period, 
r(45)=.47, p<.005, whether or not they sought reassurance, r(45)=.42, p<.005, and how 
much they had been thinking about the relevant items in the front, r(45)=.55, p<.001, and 
the back, r(45)=.77, p<.001, of their minds. Responsibility for harm also correlated well 
with how much participants had deliberately gone over in their minds what they had done 
or how they had left things, r(45)=.56, p<.001, how uncomfortable they felt at present, 
r(45)=.49, p<.005, and peak discomfort they felt during the past hour, r(45)=.54, p<.001, 
about the things they did and the way they were left. In addition, correlations were found 
between responsibility and reports of how likely it seemed that something bad would 
happen in connection with the things they did (right now: r(45)=.52, p<.001; past hr.: 
r(45)=.59, p<.001).  
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5. Discussion 
This study found no evidence for actual memory deficits in terms of reality-monitoring or 
memory for actions obsessive-compulsive checkers. The memory of OC checkers was at 
least as accurate as controls on both immediate and delayed tests of free and prompted 
recall. As predicted, confidence in memory was weaker in OCs than controls for both free 
recall and prompted recall tests, although for free recall tests, OCs showed poorer 
confidence in memory only for bothersome (i.e. OCD relevant) actions on the immediate 
memory test. Also, both OCs and controls remembered non-bothersome actions better 
than bothersome actions on tests of prompted recall. These findings are broadly 
consistent with those previous studies finding no reality-monitoring deficit in obsessive-
compulsive checkers (Constans et al., 1995; McNally & Kohlbeck 1993). This research is 
also consistent with previous work demonstrating that OCs report less confidence in their 
memory than non-clinical controls (MacDonald, Antony, Macleod, & Richter, 1997; 
McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993).  
The post-experiment interview revealed a number of differences between OCs 
and controls in terms of their reaction to the memory task. OCs reported that they were 
less confident “that there was no problem with the way an item was left”. OCs also 
reported less confidence for bothersome items than non-bothersome items, a difference 
absent in controls. In addition, controls scored lower on self-reported measures of 
anxiety, discomfort, urge to check at present and maximum urge to check in the past hour 
on tests relating to specific action sequences. With the exception of measures of peak 
urge to check, OCs, but not controls, scored higher on these measures if they were 
associated with bothersome items, rather than non-bothersome items. These results come 
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as no surprise given the specificity of checking problems in OCs, and they complement 
other findings in this study showing better recall for non-bothersome items than 
bothersome ones.  
Although the experimental responsibility manipulation (contract) failed to impact 
the group responsibility levels, correlational analyses revealed that individual differences 
in self-reported feelings of responsibility were associated with memory accuracy and 
confidence, as well as other measures. Measures of perceived responsibility correlated 
with how much a participant ruminated about the significant items, how much the 
participants had gone over in their mind what they had done or how they had left things, 
and discomfort felt during the delay period. In addition, after controlling for memory 
performance on the immediate memory test, higher levels of responsibility during the 
one-hour delay period were associated with poorer prompted recall memory for non-
bothersome items following the delay period. Higher responsibility ratings were also 
associated with poorer confidence in memory for non-bothersome items on the delay free 
recall test. These findings may be due to associations between responsibility and 
increased attentiveness to bothersome items during the delay period, rather than a direct 
association between responsibility and poor performance with non-bothersome items.  
The perceived likelihood that something bad could happen in connection with the 
things one did was also correlated with responsibility ratings. This is consistent with 
Lopatka and Rachman’s (1995) study which showed how an inflated sense of 
responsibility for an unwanted event is associated with a higher estimate of the likelihood 
that the unwanted event could occur.   
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It was not clear why the responsibility manipulation in the present study failed. 
We suspect that the responsibility contracts lacked sufficient credibility. Recent research 
has used other responsibility manipulations that were highly effective (Arntz, Voncken, 
& Goosen, 2007; Mancini & Gangemi, 2006), and this research found the expected 
relationships between responsibility and OC symptoms. The fact that this experiment 
took place in the homes of participants limited the choice of responsibility manipulations 
available, as other studied manipulations have been laboratory-based.  
A curious finding among OCs, but absent in controls, was the correlation between 
delayed tests of prompted recall accuracy and ratings of confidence in memory. That is, 
OCs were more accurate in their judgement about how well they can rely on their 
memory for actions. This phenomenon may be due to excessive attention that OCs give 
to mental processes (Salkovskis, 1985). Comparable patterns of attention have been 
detected in panic disorder patients who make fewer errors in terms of bodily sensations 
(heart rates) (Ehlers & Breuer, 1992). These data are consistent with cognitive theories 
which focus on over-attentiveness as a contributing factor to anxiety disorders (eg, Beck, 
Emery, & Greenberg, 1985). It might be deduced from the findings of the present 
experiment that it is not memory difficulties per se that are the source of the problem. 
Rather, it may be beliefs about and over-attentiveness to memory processes that 
contribute to compulsive checking.  
The results do not support the hypothesis that checkers have an actual deficit in 
memory which motivates them to check. Rather, they are most consistent with the 
cognitive-behavioural view that people suffering from OCD check because they 
experience levels of confidence in memory that do not meet the high standards they set 
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for themselves; that is, they try to be particularly sure because they have unusually high 
levels of concern about making an error. 
Limitations to the study include the use of semi-ideographic methodology. 
Actions chosen for the memory task were chosen from a restricted list, resulting in some 
variability in items used, and it is possible that some actions may have been easier to 
recall than others. However, there was no evidence of systematic differences between 
groups in terms of items chosen. The fact that the experimenter was not blind to 
participant diagnostic status is a further issue; the careful scripting of the study should 
have prevented this potential bias from affecting the results. The study also lacked a 
clinical control group; the fact that memory was unimpaired in OCs means that this is not 
a major issue. Though research suggests poor memory confidence is specific to OC 
checkers (Cougle, Salkovskis, & Wahl, 2007), it is not known whether poor memory 
confidence would also be present among anxious controls and non-checking OCs when 
using in-home reality monitoring tasks. 
The advantage of the present study’s methodology is that it ensured that the 
memory tasks were meaningful to OC checkers in the environment where checking 
behaviour occurs. The inclusion of a delayed test gave an opportunity to examine how 
different thought patterns and memory processes could relate to responsibility and 
checking behaviours. Past work on OCD and memory was limited by the use of tasks 
which were far removed from the daily concerns of OCs (Bouvard & Cottraux, 1997; 
Purcell et al., 1998) or memory for actions tasks which did not take into consideration the 
specificity involved in checking problems and such phenomena as feelings of 
responsibility which may play an important role in maintaining OCD (Constans et al., 
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1995; Ecker & Engelkamp, 1995; Hermans et al., 2003; McNally & Kohlbeck, 1993). 
Future research on memory and compulsive checking should take into consideration the 
importance of context in OC memory failures. The findings of the present study suggest 
that compulsive checking may be more effectively treated if beliefs about memory are 
targeted as part of cognitive-behavioural therapy (Salkovskis, 1999).  
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Table 1.  
 
Demographic and psychometric data.  
         
 
  
 
OC checkers 
 
Non-clinical controls 
 
Group comparisons 
 
Gender 
 
8 male 13 female 
 
9 male 15 female 
 
X 2=.002, p>.5 
 mean SD Mean SD  
BDI 
 
20.43 (8.6) 3.63 (3.9) F(1,43)=74.44, p<.0001 
BAI 
 
20.29 (9.5) 5.21   (3.5) F(1,43)=51.93, p<.0001 
OCI 
 
72.76 (28.4) 19.50   (13.0) F(1,43)=68.07, p<.0001 
OCI - 
checking 
20.71 (7.9) 3.42 (3.2) F(1,43)=96.44, p<.0001 
RAS 
 
4.93 (0.6) 3.87 (0.8) F(1,43)=25.12, p<.0001 
RIQ beliefs 
 
44.69 (22.1) 31.13 (18.8) F(1,39)=4.49, p<.05 
RIQ freq. 
 
1.68 (0.9) 0.88 (0.7) F(1,40)=10.37, p<.005 
Age 
 
37.29 (10.0) 41.79 (13.8) F(1,39)=2.88, p=.10 
Years of 
education 
past age 12 
6.80 (2.4) 7.46 (2.6) F(1,43)=5.54, p<.05 
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Table 2.  
Categories of actions used in reality-monitoring tests and number of participants 
labelling each category among their two most bothersome or two least bothersome 
compulsions.  
Actions Non-clinical Controls  OC checkers 
1. Door 13 Bothersome 13 Bothersome 
1 Non-bothersome 
2. Windows 
 
1 Bothersome 
3 Non-bothersome 
 
3. Lights 4 Non-bothersome 2 Bothersome 
5 Non-bothersome 
4. Plugs 1 Bothersome 
6 Non-bothersome 
7 Bothersome 
6 Non-bothersome 
5. Sharp objects 1 Bothersome 
12 Non-bothersome 
8 Non-bothersome 
6. Cooker/Oven 13 Bothersome 
1 Non-bothersome 
7 Bothersome 
7. Poisons (bleach, 
medicine, etc.) 
 
14 Non-bothersome 2 Bothersome 
5 Non-bothersome 
8. Ordering 1 Bothersome 
6 Non-bothersome 
1 Bothersome 
7 Non-bothersome 
9. Reading 4 Bothersome 
1 Non-bothersome 
3 Bothersome 
5 Non-Bothersome 
10. Water taps 2 Bothersome 
1 Non-bothersome 
1 Bothersome 
3 Non-bothersome 
11. Wallet/purse, money, 
and keys 
12 Bothersome 6 Bothersome 
2 Non-bothersome 
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Table 3.  
Free recall and prompted recall memory accuracy and confidence in memory. 
 OC Checkers Non-clinical Controls 
 
 
 
Accuracy  
Mean (SD) 
Confidence in 
Memory 
Mean (SD) 
 
Accuracy  
Mean (SD) 
Confidence in 
Memory 
Mean (SD) 
 
Immediate 
 
 
FR-B 
 
 
5.57 (1.9) 
 
77.39 (18.7) 
 
5.54 (2.4) 
 
93.64 (8.0) 
 FR – NB 
 
5.90 (2.4) 87.37 (14.4) 7.21 (2.8) 95.27 (5.3) 
 PR – B 
 
10.14 (1.5) 72.82 (14.5) 9.83 (1.3) 89.27 (9.1) 
 
 
PR – NB 10.81 (1.1) 79.17 (16.0) 10.83 (1.3) 92.43 (6.7) 
Delayed 
 
FR – B 
 
5.81 (2.1) 82.80 (16.8) 6.42 (2.9) 94.26 (7.0) 
 
 
FR – NB 6.76 (2.8) 83.94 (16.8) 8.42 (2.6) 95.04 (6.4) 
 
 
PR – B 10.38 (1.4) 74.40 (15.7) 9.96 (1.9) 89.65 (9.3) 
 PR – NB 10.33 (1.5) 77.78 (17.5) 10.79 (1.2) 93.47 (7.1) 
Note: FR = Free recall; PR = Prompted recall; B = Bothersome actions; NB = Non-bothersome 
actions. 
 
